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This paper is concerned with the challenges, but also the opportunities, created by
digitalization for the taxation of multinational profit. To cite the European
Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy:
“The economy is becoming digital. Digitalization is the process of spreading of a
general purpose technology. The last similar phenomenon was electrification.
Digitalization of products and services shortens distances between people and
things. It increases mobility. It makes network effects decisive. It allows the use of
specific data to such an extent that it permits the satisfaction of individual
customer needs – be it consumers or businesses. It opens up ample opportunities
for innovation, investment, and the creation of new businesses and jobs. Going
forward it will be one of the main drivers of sustainable growth.”2
Starting from the same approach as the European Commission Expert Group and the
OECD,3 we do not believe that it is sensible to attempt to “ring-fence” the digital
economy as if it were distinct and separate from the rest of the economy such as, for
example, natural resources. All industries are affected by digitalization, in particular
for our purposes, in the way it opens up borders. Compared to twenty years ago,
individuals can easily purchase goods and services directly from businesses in other
countries, and they can easily purchase shares in businesses in other countries. Even
small and medium-sized companies can now operate internationally. So, although
digitalization is most pronounced in the “digital” sector, it raises problems for
taxation in all sectors of the economy.
1 We thank Michael Keen, and other participants at the IMF conference on “Digital Revolutions in
Public Finance” in April 2017, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2 European Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy (2014), p.5.
3 OECD (2015), p.54.
2This greater internationalization raises fundamental questions about how national
governments can and should tax corporate profit, and the extent to which they need
to coordinate with each other in doing so. These questions arise against a backdrop
of increasing public concern with the taxation of profits of multinational enterprises
(MNEs), spurred by a general belief that many have found it relatively easy to
arrange their affairs to pay minimal amounts of tax. Businesses that are clearly
digital are in the forefront of this concern, as they appear to be able to shift profit to
tax havens with ease, but these problems are not restricted to such companies. A
variety of tax planning techniques to shift profits to tax havens or low tax
jurisdictions is available to all companies.
In response to this widespread concern, the OECD and G20 launched a reform
project in 2013 – the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. This was hailed
as the most ambitious reform of the international tax system of the past 100 years.
However it did not usher in radical change. The BEPS project left the fundamental
structure of the international tax system unchanged but proposed a number of
actions with the aim of eliminating or narrowing some of the main tax planning
routes available at the time.
Action 1 of the BEPS project dealt with the digital economy.4 Its Final Report
identified and discussed the main challenges presented by the digital economy and
also discussed a number of targeted measures. However, it did not propose any of
these targeted measures. Instead, it took into account the specific issues raised by
the digital economy when developing its general proposals. These general proposals
were therefore intended to substantially address the issues raised by the digital
economy. An update of this report is expected in 2020. In the meantime, a number
of targeted measures have been adopted unilaterally by some jurisdictions. For
example, India introduced an “equalization levy” and the UK and Australia
introduced “Diverted Profits Taxes”; these do not exclusively target primarily digital
companies, but those companies were certainly at the forefront of the thinking
behind them. Indeed, the UK Diverted Profits Tax is widely known as the “Google
Tax”.
For the reasons given below, we do not believe that the international tax system is
fit for purpose, even as reformed following the BEPS project. Consequently, we
believe that the proliferation of a variety of uncoordinated measures implemented
within the existing framework is unlikely to provide a long-term satisfactory solution
to the challenges to the tax system presented by digitalization.
4 For a critical evaluation see Olbert and Spengel (2017).
3In this chapter we take for granted that governments will wish to continue to
implement taxes on business profit, and focus on the form of such taxes. We take a
broad view, comparing the existing pattern of such taxation with radical alternatives.
We focus on radical alternatives and not on proposals to bring change within the
existing framework of the international tax system because we believe that the
existing framework itself is flawed and cannot provide a long-term solution to the
problems at hand. We also do not cover other taxes relevant to businesses such as
Value Added Taxes (VATs), although, as shall be seen, some key issues which arise
under VATs also arise under some of the reform proposals we consider.
Part I of this chapter sets out a simple model of a modern multinational company
and then briefly describes how the existing system seeks to tax its profit. Part II
discusses two radical alternative approaches to coping with the impact of
digitalization on the allocation of the tax base among countries. Part III considers
other models which are more specific to digital businesses. Part IV briefly concludes.
I. Digitalization and the existing international corporate tax regime
Consider the following example:
 A MNE has its headquarters and parent company in country P
 It has shareholders in country S
 It has a manufacturing subsidiary in country M
 It owns intangible assets in a subsidiary situated in a low tax jurisdiction, L
 It sells products to consumers in country C, where it also has a marketing
team.
Note that this example is clearly much simplified relative to actual practice. But it
serves to illustrate the main points of principle.
How does the existing system tax such a company? Essentially, it sets out to avoid
“double taxation”, by allocating taxing rights between “residence” and “source”
countries. Very broadly, the residence country is where a person, natural or legal,
who has the right to receive the profits of the activity resides while the source
country is where the economic activity takes place. Broadly again, in a “1920s
4compromise”5 in the League of Nations, source countries were allocated primary
taxing rights to the active income of the business, and residence countries the
primary taxing rights to passive income, such as dividends, royalties and interest.6
Crucially, these rules apply, with some modification, to transactions within the MNE,
that is, when an affiliate of an MNE transacts with another affiliate located in a
different jurisdiction. This is of great consequence because MNEs can set up
subsidiaries and other affiliates anywhere in the world with relatively minimal effort
and they can also dictate the number and kind of transactions amongst such
affiliates.
This compromise is fraught with difficulty; its implementation requires defining and
policing the border between residence and source countries, and between different
types of income. Yet the compromise remains integral to the fundamental structure
of the international tax system, and many of the problems afflicting the system
ultimately stem from this very structure.
This can be illustrated in the context of our example, in which the company may pay
tax on its profit in some or all of countries P, M, L and C – and shareholders may pay
additional tax in S. In general, a company which is a subsidiary of a multinational
company is also a legal entity in the country in which it is established and therefore
liable to tax on its profit in that country. To begin with, therefore, the manufacturing
subsidiary would pay tax on the profits that it generates in M. However, suppose
that the manufacturing subsidiary paid a royalty to the subsidiary in L owning the
intangible asset – this could be for intellectual property (IP) used in production, for
example. This would shift profit from M to L, since the royalty would be deductible in
M and taxable in L.
A system which allows MNEs to shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions by
placing IP in the latter is clearly defective. Note also that the MNE can increase the
profit shifted from M to L by inflating the royalty payment. As intra-group prices of
this kind are easily manipulated, complex rules are in place to address such
practices. These rules – transfer pricing rules – essentially require intra-group prices
to be aligned with the prices which would have been charged by unrelated parties.
However, these complex rules are problematic for a variety of reasons and they
ultimately do not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem at hand.7
5 Graetz (2001).
6 See for example Warren (1994) and Avi-Yonah (1996).
7 See for example Avi-Yonah (1995), Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2011) and Devereux and Vella (2014).
5The extent to which profit is allocated to C depends on the rules for “permanent
establishments (PEs)”. As there is no subsidiary in C, the subsidiary in M sells
products directly to consumers in C. The question then becomes whether the
subsidiary in M is operating in C through a PE, which in turn depends broadly on the
physical presence of the company in that country. In our example, if the marketing
team constitutes a PE part of the profits of the manufacturing subsidiary in M would
be allocated to C for tax purposes. Complex rules are in place for defining a PE, and
attributing profits to a PE.
Finally, if a dividend is paid to the parent company in P, then the parent may also
have to pay tax on the receipt of that dividend, usually after receiving a credit for
taxes paid elsewhere.8
The actual allocation of profit in practice depends on many factors. As noted, for
example, the extent to which profit can be shifted to L depends on the size of the
royalty payment made by the manufacturing company. It also depends on how the
company was originally able to arrange ownership of the intangible asset in L. If, for
example, the IP was developed by another subsidiary located in a high tax
jurisdiction and then transferred to the subsidiary in L, the allocation of profit would
also depend on the price paid on the transfer. The size of both these payments is
governed by transfer pricing rules.
The effects of digitalization
Has digitalization affected this position?
A starting point is that this example could exist in the absence of digitalization; this is
not intended to be a model of company in the “digital” sector. Broadly, digitalization
does not affect the nature of the problem. However, digitalization does exacerbate
the problem. This is primarily because digitalization facilitates the
internationalisation of all aspects of a company’s business. In other words, as a
result of digitalization it is easier for a company’s shareholders, activities and
customers to be located all over the world.
First, and perhaps most obviously, the setup of the multinational firm in many
different countries benefits enormously from greater digitalization. In a world of
modern communications, it is relatively easy for businesses to be run from many
different locations, in increasing complex supply chains – to the extent that
8 Countries that tax such income are commonly designated as having a worldwide tax system;
countries which do not are designated as having a territorial system.
6identifying “the” location of a particular activity becomes increasingly difficult. For
example, it is increasingly possible for the R&D, production and marketing of a
product to be undertaken in different countries. Indeed, the production of different
components of a product and their assembly may all be undertaken in different
countries. Digitalization is one of the main factors albeit not the only one, which
facilitates this internationalization.
The problem becomes more acute in a purely digital world. Consider the example of
an app which is collaboratively developed and tested by employees based in a
number of countries. As business activities spread across the globe, it becomes even
harder for the existing international tax system to allocate their taxable profit in a
coherent and sensible manner which satisfies all of the countries involved.
A second consequence of digitalization is an increase in the ease with which profits
can be shifted to low tax jurisdictions. Digitalization has made it easier to set up a
subsidiary in L, and to make payments to that company, be they royalty, interest or
other payments which produce valuable deductions in high tax jurisdictions. In
extreme cases, the company in L may simply be a money-collecting box, without any
real employees. The OECD BEPS project seeks to address the worst excesses of such
strategies. We discuss some of these issues further below.
A third consequence of digitalization is that it is easier for a MNE to sell its products
to consumers in a particular jurisdiction with minimal or no physical presence there.
This is evident in cross-border sales of digital products but it can also arise in more
traditional businesses as seen in our example above. Indeed, digitalization affords
MNEs greater freedom in choosing the location of their marketing team. With
modern communications, advertising of all forms, including through social media,
may be managed by staff located outside country C. Where this happens, the
consumers’ country, C, is less likely to be able to tax any part of the profits resulting
from the sale because the physical presence necessary to satisfy the threshold is
missing. The OECD Commentaries set out the rationale for the traditional PE
threshold. They state that the threshold “has a long history and reflects the
international consensus that, as a general rule, until an enterprise of one State has a
permanent establishment in another State, it should not properly be regarded as
participating in the economic life of that other State to such an extent that the other
State should have taxing rights on its profits” (Commentaries to Article 7, para. 11).
The PE concept thus “effectively acts as a threshold which, by measuring the level of
economic presence of a foreign enterprise in a given State through objective criteria,
determines the circumstances in which the foreign enterprise can be considered
7sufficiently integrated into the economy of a state to justify taxation in that state.”9
In the context of our example, moving the marketing team to M, for example, would
take away the taxing rights previously assigned to C. Arguably, digitalization would
then allow companies to generate value more easily in jurisdictions where they
make sales (and which are then arguably “source” countries) but which would not
have taxing rights because companies’ operations there fall short of the PE
threshold.
The OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report discusses this possibility.10 It considers
expanding the notion of PE by using revenue-based factors, digital factors and user
based-functions. It also considers how to allocate profit to such a PE. The existing
profit allocation rules would not work well in this setting and so the OECD considers
alternatives including methods based on fractional apportionment and modified
deemed profits methods. However, the discussion in that report illustrates how
difficult it is to produce satisfactory rules of this type.
Finally, digitalization has also contributed to the increasing distinction between
where a parent company is located and where its shareholders are. There has
traditionally been a “home bias” in the investment portfolio decisions of individuals
and mutual funds. However, data suggest that this has shrunk considerably over
time. In addition, the share of personal savings held in tax exempt accounts has
increased. As a result, for example, Rosenthal and Austin (2016) estimate that the
share of US corporate stock held in personal taxable accounts fell by more than two-
thirds over the last 50 years, from 84% in 1965 to 24% in 2015. For the more open
economy of the UK, the share of listed company stock held directly by domestic
individuals fell from 54% in 1963 to 12% in 2014.11 Rosenthal and Austin report that
foreigners directly owned around 26% of US corporate stock in 2015; the equivalent
percentage for the UK for 2014 is 54% - and this has grown from 7% in 1963.12
Where there is international portfolio investment, the link between the location of
shareholders and parent companies breaks down; and this link is become weaker
over time.
This distinction raises the more fundamental question of whether a tax on corporate
profit is a reasonable proxy for the taxation of the income due to shareholders. In a
world of increasing international portfolio investment, the notion that it is a
reasonable proxy is increasingly hard to defend.
9 OECD BEPS Final Report, Action 1, p. 26.
10 OECD BEPS Final Report, Action 1, Chapter 7.
11 See Office for National Statistics (2014).
12 Ibid.
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Reference has already been made to the OECD BEPS project, which began in 2013,
and which produced an extensive set of reports recommending numerous reforms in
2015. The broad thrust of the proposed reforms purport not to be changing the
current allocation of taxing rights, but they do depart from it to some extent.13 This
is done by adding a qualification to the current allocation rules where abuse is
perceived. Specifically, although there is no clear unifying theme, a number of the
actions focus on “economic activity”, “relevant substance”, “substantial activity” or
“value creation”14. The general analysis repeatedly speaks of the need for “a
realignment of taxation and relevant substance … to restore the intended effects
and benefits of international standards.”15 The OECD claim that “no or low taxation
is not per se a cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is associated with
practices that artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate
it.”16
At a general level, then, the OECD BEPS proposals aim to “provide countries with
domestic and international instruments that will better align rights to tax with
economic activity”.17 This principle is reflected in the specific actions. As we have
written at length elsewhere,18 there are many problems associated with this new
principle. We highlight two central problems here.
First, this new principle is simply different from the existing principles inherited from
the 1920s. As the basic structure is being kept in place and the new principle is being
overlaid on top it, the post-BEPS international tax system is likely to be more
incoherent, with taxing rights being aligned with economic substance in some cases
but not in others. There does not appear to be any principle for distinguishing
between the two set of cases; at best, reliance will be placed on vague and arbitrary
tests such as “artificial” and “excessive”.
13 Devereux and Vella (2014), pp. 461-464.
14 The four terms appear to be used interchangeably.
15 OECD (2015).
16 “BEPS relates chiefly to instances where the interaction of different tax rules leads to double non-
taxation or less than single taxation. It also relates to arrangements that achieve no or low taxation by
shifting profits away from the jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take place. No or
low taxation is not per se a cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is associated with practices
that artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it.” OECD (2015), page 10
[Emphasis added].
17 OECD (2015), p. 11.
18 Devereux and Vella (2014).
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over income with the ‘economic activity’ that created it is questionable because it is
not at all clear where such economic activity actually takes place. Numerous factors
contribute to the creation of income, including finance, research and development,
head-office functions, manufacturing, marketing and sales. All of these factors are
necessary components of the generation of profit in an MNE. But they might be
spread over a number of countries, making it impossible – even conceptually - to
pinpoint the contribution of each specific location to the overall profit earned.
II. Alternative approaches
The existing system – and, in all probability, the post-BEPS system – has numerous
faults. The problem with the current international tax regime that most concerns
commentators is that of avoidance and profit shifting. This was the key issue
addressed by the BEPS project, and it is likely that the BEPS project will succeed to
some extent in limiting the worst excesses of the profit shifting industry. However,
the arbitrary distinctions in the tax system will remain, and the lack of any clear
principle for where profit should be taxed is not a good basis for a stable tax system.
It is unlikely that the problems of profit shifting have been overcome permanently,
and much greater complexity has been introduced.
Further, as has been well documented, the system also affects the location of real
economic activity.19 Partly as a result, this fragile tax system is further destabilized by
competition amongst states. States compete for investment and company
headquarters through their tax rates and bases. For the sake of competition they are
willing to give up parts of their tax bases or knowingly allow them to be eroded (e.g.
by offering generous interest deductibility rules). They are also willing to facilitate
the erosion of the base of other jurisdictions. Tax competition amongst states thus
further destabilizes the already fragile international tax system and will continue to
do so post-BEPS.
Paradoxically, the BEPS project could enhance tax competitive forces. If a tax system
becomes more robust to profit shifting, companies which wish to lower their global
tax bill may have to do so by relocating their real activities to low tax jurisdictions. It
seems likely that the outcome of the BEPS project will be at least some reduction in
the ability of MNEs to use traditional methods to shift their profits to law tax
19 See the literature survey by Voget (2015).
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jurisdictions. But if companies have to move their real activities to obtain a favorable
tax result, one can then expect states to compete even more intensely through the
tax system, since attracting real economic activity (or deterring local companies from
moving their real activities abroad) is associated with broader economic benefits
than merely attracting (or deterring the outflow of) profit.
A simple example illustrates this point. Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan addresses
Harmful Tax Practices, with a particular focus on patent box regimes. These regimes
offer preferential rates on returns generated by IP. Action 5 seeks to counter
situations where IP is produced through R&D activity undertaken in State A, but
subsequently transferred to State B which offers the patent box regime. Very
broadly, and subject to qualification, it does so by limiting the income which can
benefit from the patent box regime to that generated by IP which is undertaken in
the country offering the regime. In BEPS terms, this should contribute to the
alignment of taxing rights with economic activity (or at least, the R&D activity). But
this change can lead to greater real economic distortions. Post-BEPS, MNEs will have
to move their R&D to the jurisdiction offering the patent box if they are to benefit
from it. Given that attracting R&D activity is more beneficial to an economy than
merely attracting IP, it follows that states should compete even more intensely over
the rates levied on the returns to IP.
A related point on the impact of the BEPS proposals on tax competition follows from
the observation that states currently compete through the tax rate and base. The
curtailment of profit shifting opportunities essentially makes it harder for states to
compete through the tax base. For example, BEPS Action 4 recommends the
introduction of rules limiting the deductibility of interest. This blunts states’ ability to
offer generous interest deductibility rules which have the effect of eroding tax bases
in those states. As competition over some aspects of the tax base is curtailed, the
pressure to compete over tax rates increases.
From an economic perspective, there is a powerful argument to tax corporate profit
in the location of immobile (or relatively immobile) activities. As, by definition,
companies cannot easily move the location of these activities, such taxes should
have a reduced or even minimal impact on the location of corporate activity. They
should also be harder to avoid. In other words, such taxes have attractive economic
efficiency properties. It also follows that because companies cannot easily move the
location of immobile activities in response these taxes, states will not have an
incentive to compete through their tax system to attract these activities.
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The options available for taxing MNEs include four broad locations: the residence of
the ultimate shareholders; the residence of the ultimate parent company; the
location of subsidiaries and permanent establishments of the MNE; and the
residence of its customers. Each of the activities taking place in these locations
might be thought to be necessary, but not sufficient, for the generation of profit
(and the ‘creation of value’): the initial investment by shareholders, management
by the parent company, all of the activities of the affiliates of the company, and
eventually sales to third parties.
The current international tax system for taxing profit is, by and large, based on the
third (and partly the second) of the broad locations listed above. As companies can
choose where to locate either, the current system distorts these location choices
and is thus inefficient. 20
However, most individuals are relatively immobile. The residences of the ultimate
shareholders of a MNE and of its customers thus offer promising options for
corporate tax reform. If the tax liability of a MNE depends on where its parent
company, its intellectual property, its sales teams or its production are located, it has
the ability and the incentive to shift these factors to favourable locations so as to
lower its overall tax liability. But a MNE cannot easily move the residence of its
shareholders (subject to the caveat noted below) or customers and therefore it
should choose the location of its activities without the distorting influence of tax
considerations.
We discuss each of these two options in turn.
a. Location of Shareholders
One radical reform option would be based on attempting to tax corporate profit as it
accrues, but in the hands of the ultimate shareholders. A major advantage of such an
approach would be that the location of the tax on profit is identified as the location
of the owner of the business. While individuals are not immobile, they are certainly
much less mobile than the key elements of a multinational business. Locating the
taxation of business profit – of a multinational, or a company resident only in one
country – in the place of residence of the owner, therefore would have a
considerable advantage for both profit shifting and the location of real economic
20 The headline-grabbing company “inversions” out of the US provide a vivid example of distortions to
the location of parent companies.
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activity. It would also align with one of the commonly voiced rationales for a
corporation tax – that of acting as a proxy for the taxation of its shareholders.21
Throughout the discussion which follows, it should be borne in mind that MNEs are
unlikely to be able to shift shareholders to low tax jurisdictions to lower their overall
tax liability if their shares are widely held. However, if the shares are held by a small
number of shareholders, there is perhaps a greater likelihood of such a shift. In such
cases, corporation taxes levied in the shareholders’ residence provide a further
incentive – beyond incentives created by personal taxes – for these shareholders to
move their residence to low tax jurisdictions.
Allocating the profits of a company to its shareholders for the purposes of including
those profits in the taxable income of the shareholder is generally known as pass-
through treatment. Business profit is allocated to shareholders who for tax purposes
include their share of profit in their personal income. This is broadly how S-
corporations are taxed in the US, and is also common for taxing partnerships.
In principle, there could be several ways in which profit is passed through to the
owners of the business. One approach – which is used for S corporations in the US,
for example - would be to allocate all profit to shareholders. Dividend payments
from the company to the shareholder, and capital gains on the sale of shares, would
then not need to be also taxed.22 In that case, in principle, in any tax year for the
individual, the individual would need to declare in her tax return her share of any
profit accrued within companies which she has owned within that year.23 Note that
“her share” would depend on the proportion of each company that she owned
during the year. For example, suppose that she began the year owning 10% of
company X, but after 4 months she purchased a further 50%, and then after 8
months she sold 20%, meaning that by the end of the year she owned 40%. For a
precise allocation of profit to this shareholder, the profit accruing in each of these
periods would need to be calculated, so that the correct proportion could be
21 Note that this rationale does not provide a comprehensive justification for a corporation tax.
Consider, for example, a company resident in State A owned by shareholders resident in State B. In
such a case, the tax imposed by State A on the company cannot be easily justified as a proxy for State
B’s taxes on the shareholders.
22 This tax system differs from an imputation system were profits are taxed at the corporate level but
a credit for this tax is given to shareholders when computing the tax to be paid on dividends received.
23 There is a problem of matching the year-end of the company and the tax year of the shareholder. It
is more straightforward to rely on the financial year of the company, and to allocate a share of
retained earnings at this point in time to be included in some subsequent tax return of the
shareholder.
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allocated to the shareholder for each part of the year.24 In practice, and as an
approximation to this, the shareholder could be allocated a share of the total annual
profit of the year based on her average shareholding (in this case 36.7%) during the
year.25
A second option would to be to tax only the dividends and capital gains received by
the shareholder, which could in principle mean that the corporate level tax could be
abolished entirely. Different versions of such an approach have been proposed
recently. In an US context, Toder and Viard (2014) propose that non-listed firms be
taxed on a pass-through basis as described above. Shareholders of listed firms
would be taxed on the dividends and also on the accrued capital again on the value
of their shares, on a mark-to-market basis. Grubert and Altshuler (2016) make a
similar proposal, also in a US context, with dividends and capital gains being taxed as
personal income. The main difference is in the determination of the capital gains.
Grubert and Altshuler propose to tax capital gains on realisation, but to introduce an
interest charge to offset the gain from deferral of taxing accrued gains. In this case
there is no need to observe the current market price, and so the system could be
applied to all businesses. A problem with both of these proposals is that – in the US
context, at least - they would raise less tax revenue than currently raised under the
existing system. Grubert and Altshuler therefore propose to keep the corporation
tax, but at a much lower rate, and a later paper of Toder and Viard (2016) proposes
the same.
One complication ignored in this discussion so far is how to treat ownership of
shares through financial intermediaries such as mutual funds. The principle here is
that the tax should be allocated to the ultimate shareholders. But that calls into
question the taxation of intermediaries. For example, suppose that pension funds
do not pay tax on the accumulation of their returns, as is common. Then should we
view the pension fund as being the shareholder, or should we look through the
pension fund to identify the beneficiaries – who may not receive their pensions for
many decades to come? If there is a deliberate policy of providing a tax advantage
to pensions, then looking through the pension fund to tax the beneficiary would
undo this advantage. This would suggest treating the pension fund as the
shareholder. This would certainly be a simpler approach. This would of course imply
24 If the shareholding changed more frequently, then in principle the profit would need to be
calculated on a daily – or hourly, or minute-by-minute, or even second-by-second, basis.
25 For S corporations, where stock is sold mid-year the default rule is that the selling shareholder is
allocated a pro-rata share of the annual profit. So, for example, if a shareholder sells a 50% share of
the business six months into the year, she would be allocated 25% of the company’s annual profit.
But shareholders can also agree to elect that they close the books at date of sale, with a profit
allocation being made up to that date.
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that where the pension fund is not taxed on its earnings, then there would be no tax
on the profit.
A key question for our analysis, however, is how either of these two broad ways of
passing the tax on business profit to the owners of the business deals with the
problems afflicting the international tax system, and in particular the problems of
taxing multinational profit, exacerbated as this is by digitalization. Let us consider
them in turn.
The first option is to calculate business profit and allocate it to shareholders. This
simply does not address the problems of the taxation of MNEs, since that approach
is silent on how to identify and locate profit. The options for identifying that profit
are therefore those available more generally – it could be based on the residence of
the parent company, the location of the MNE’s affiliates or its customers. In the US,
for example, foreign income of S corporations is taxed in broadly the same way as
foreign income of C corporations, that are liable to corporation tax: it is included in
the tax base only when it is repatriated.
It might be natural to think of applying this option to the worldwide profit of the
business, based on the residence of the parent company, since that is the company
in which the ultimate owner directly owns shares. Where the shareholder is resident
in the same country as the parent company, this would be an effective way of taxing
the worldwide income of the shareholder. But this does not easily deal with
international portfolio investment, such as the case when a shareholder in country B
owns shares in a company in country A. In principle, the profits accrued in A should
be allocated to the shareholder in B, and taxed by the government of B.26
There would be one very significant problem with a cross-border implementation of
this option: enforcement. The tax authority of the country of residence of the
shareholder would require information from all companies (or other businesses) in
which a domestic resident has an interest. That might be acquired from the resident
shareholder, but then responsibility for information collection is passed to the
shareholder, which raises questions of how the information could be audited.
Otherwise the tax authority could collect information from the company directly, or
from the tax authority in the residence country of the company.
26 This does not happen with US shareholders; they face pass-through treatment only for S
corporations resident in the US, not on corporations resident outside the US.
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This is potentially where digitalization may offer an advantage. In a pre-digitalization
age, it is inconceivable that a tax authority in one country would have the necessary
information available to support pass-through treatment to a shareholder in
another country. However, digitalization has made this flow of information possible,
at least in principle.27 Of course, creating systems and processes to allow this would
be a huge enterprise. Also, and perhaps even more problematically, there must be
the necessary political will, commitment and investment to allow for such
information flows. Even here, however, recent events may justify relative optimism.
Both the US-imposed FATCA and the Exchange of Information project led by the G20
and OECD have resulted in information exchanges which were unthinkable a mere
few years ago. On the other hand, issues would certainly remain even if such
systems were put in place. For example, concerns about confidentiality might lead
many low-income countries to be refused such information. Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that whilst digitalization helps to create the problem of pass-through
treatment in the presence of international portfolio investment, it may also
eventually offer a technical solution.
The second option described above bypasses the first of these problems. If we take
the approach in its pure form, of abolishing the business-level tax of profit, and
relying solely on taxes on dividends and capital gains of the owners, then we no
longer have the problem of identifying the relevant profit of a multinational in any
particular jurisdiction. In effect, we would be taxing the worldwide profit of any
business directly owned – or part-owned - by the individual. That is because,
ultimately, it is a share of worldwide profit that is collected by the owner through
dividends and capital gains. However, even with this option, there remains the
problem of dealing with international portfolio investment, when a shareholder in
country B directly owns shares in a company in country A.
It is perhaps no coincidence that proposals to rely on taxes on dividends and capital
gains have been made in the context of the US, which has a sophisticated tax system
and tax authority. While it is conceivable that the US might be able to identify and
tax all dividends and realised capital gains from the worldwide holdings of US
citizens, that seems unlikely for many other countries. In particular, low income
countries tend to rely much more on taxes on business for the administrative
reasons that businesses are more likely to have financial records and to be
registered with the tax authority. Moving away from taxing the business to taxing
the owners of the business would be problematic where tax administrations lack
resources.
27 This possibility is also discussed in the chapter by Jacobs.
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Finally, note that moving to this system would lead to a fundamental reallocation of
tax base across countries. Whilst more work is needed to determine the winners
and losers, given that few shareholders in MNEs reside in low-income countries
these countries are likely to fall in the latter category.
b. Location of Consumers
An alternative radical reform would be to identify the location of the opposite end
of the spectrum of a multinationals’ activities: where it makes sales to third parties.
Borrowing from the literature on VAT, we call this the place of “destination”.28
A key advantage of using the country of destination is similar to that of using the
country of residence of the shareholders; consumers are relatively immobile.29 At
least in most cases, we would not expect a consumer to change her location in order
to reduce the tax charge of the multinational from which she buys a product
(although this could be possible if the customer also gains). Thus, under such a
system, and unlike a typical tax based on the location of a MNE’s affiliates or the
location of the parent company, it is hard for the multinational to affect the location
of its tax charge.
In principle, this has significant advantages for economic efficiency, robustness to
avoidance and competitive pressures. As noted above, the existing system creates
significant distortions to the location of economic activity, and the ownership of
assets within a multinational, because these factors determine the location of the
tax base. But where a multinational sells its product to a third party depends on the
location of that third party. In principle, then, a tax based on the destination of sales
could avoid such location distortions. A similar argument applies to profit shifting: if
income is taxed in the place of destination, then it is very hard for a multinational to
manipulate the source and hence the place of taxation of that income. As a result of
these two factors, the likelihood of competition among countries should also be
avoided. If country A lowers its tax rate, it should not attract either activity or tax
revenue from country B, since the taxable income depends only on sales in A.
28 The US Ways and Means Committee (2016) recently proposed a tax reform which would move the
US to a destination-based tax, along the lines of a destination-based cash flow tax; see Auerbach et al
(2017).
29 Problems may arise when a consumer purchases a good or service in a country in which she is not
resident. The OECD has guidelines on value added tax “place of supply” rules which address this.
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While these are powerful reasons for exploring a tax based on the place of
destination, it could be argued that having a tax based solely on the destination of
sales is rather arbitrary. Under the existing system, as refined by the OECD BEPS
project, it has been argued that the return from an activity should be taxed in the
place of the activity; thus the return from undertaking research and development
(R&D) should be taxed in the place where the R&D is undertaken. A system based
solely on the destination of sales would not achieve this. And so arguably, there may
be a problem in terms of the fairness of the allocation of the tax base among
countries.
Several points can be made in defence of the destination location, however. First, it
is not obvious that the return from R&D, say, should accrue to the place in which it
was undertaken. Undertaking the R&D may be necessary, but it is not sufficient, for
generating a return. Ultimately, the R&D must be used to produce a good or service
that a third party wants to purchase. That requires several other necessary parts of
the chain, including production, management, finance, marketing and sales – as well
as the ownership of the business. Without all of these components, the
multinational will not make a profit. It is true that the existing system attempts to
identify that part of the profit attributable to the different elements of this chain but
certain parts of the chain may be ignored altogether by the existing system, for
example the country of sale if there is no PE. It is not at all clear conceptually how
much value should be attributed to each part of the chain if each is necessary but
not sufficient. The allocation to the different parts inevitably has a somewhat
arbitrary nature. Finally, this somewhat arbitrary allocation is further undermined
under the existing system as it is applied inconsistently.
Second, the place of destination can in principle be an important source of profit,
even under current rules. The jurisdiction of “the market” is where what valuation
experts describe as “customer-based intangibles” reside. Such intangibles are an
important part of the value of many successful multinational enterprises. For
example, in many technology businesses, once a customer has installed a particular
company’s hardware, software or both, the company has a competitive advantage
for subsequent generations of products and services independent of any
technological superiority over other businesses; the value of this advantage
amounts to an customer-based intangible asset of the company. Similarly in many
businesses one successful product, whether based on technology, identification of
consumer tastes, or some blend of both, can give a favourable image to a company,
which can help sell other products in the future. The intangibles that reflect these
elements of value are often described as an “installed customer base” or “customer
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relations” or even “goodwill”. Once developed they can have value far in excess of
any specific technology that fuelled their initial creation. Arguably, these intangibles
are inherently located in the jurisdiction of final purchaser for the product or service,
which is the market jurisdiction, because that is where the customer is.
Of course, not all profit is attributable to this type of customer-based intangibles.
The development of new products and services, typically protected by patents,
trademarks and/or copyrights, clearly are an important element in generating such
returns. Yet there is also a rationale for sourcing a substantial part of these returns
to the market jurisdiction: the value of these products is determined in substantial
part by the legal protections offered through patent, trademark, copyright and other
laws in the market jurisdiction itself. A patent-protected drug cannot generate
residual returns in a market that readily permits generic products to be sold without
regard to patent rights. Similarly, a handbag maker cannot readily earn residual
returns if knock-offs are readily available. It is the predominantly the law of the
market jurisdiction that protects these elements of value.
A tax on profit on a destination basis can therefore be seen in part as a return to
several sources of profit, related to the country of the consumer. This may justify
some taxation on the basis of a charge for publicly provided services, where those
services are, for example, the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights. But
it should be acknowledged that a multinational is also likely to benefit from publicly
provided goods and services in other locations, such as the location of production,
or R&D. So taxing profit solely on a destination basis cannot be justified solely as a
way of contributing to the cost of publicly provided goods and services.
A third and more compelling argument for taxing corporate profits on a destination
basis is that it might be the only viable option in the long run. As competitive forces
continue to drive down source- and residence-based corporate tax rates, countries
might simply find that they are unable to meet their revenue targets for corporation
tax under the existing system. In this sense, a decision to move to a destination
based corporate tax system reflects an acceptance of the equilibrium towards which
countries are being driven by the tax competitive process and a conscious attempt to
free themselves from this process. Once a decision is made to tax corporate profit on
a destination basis, countries acquire the ability to set their corporate tax rates
according to their preferences and free of competitive forces.
A tax based on destination solves many of the problems which affect the existing tax
system and which are exacerbated by digitalization. But it also introduces new
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problems, depending on the system used.30 One option is a VAT-type approach in
which exports are not taxed, but imports are taxed; this is known as a destination-
based cash flow tax,31 or DBCFT.32 This means that sales would be taxed in the
location of the purchaser, while expenses would receive relief where they were
incurred. A country would effectively tax domestic sales less domestic expenses.
Under this option, one issue arising is the taxation of imports for B2C transactions.
For B2B transactions, this should not be problematic. Imports by businesses could
be taxed, but they would also receive relief. These two tax effects would exactly
cancel out. Imports by businesses could, alternatively, simply be ignored. So
challenges for collecting revenue under a DBCFT relate primarily to cross-border
B2C transactions, though it would be necessary to identify whether a transaction is
B2B or B2C.
The DBCFT would tax imports purchased by individual consumers and non-taxable
entities. Where a customer purchases a good or service directly from a business in
another country, a tax should be levied at the rate of the destination country. Two
options open to the destination country are to collect the tax from the exporting
company or from the consumer. The former appears to be the more realistic option,
although not without difficulties of its own, especially in the absence of fiscal
borders, or for digital products, as is clear from the operation of VAT. These are
difficulties that already arise under the VAT. In principle it would be necessary for
the exporting company to register for tax in the country into which it is exporting
the good or service; this is difficult to administer for relatively small exporters,
particularly when the good or service can be downloaded electronically, or where
there are no customs operations at borders. The exporter must also identify the
location of its customer, and – depending in the treatment of business imports -
whether the customer is a business or a consumer. The tax authority must identify
companies from around the world that export to its country, and also guard against
any opportunities for fraud if, for example, and again depending on the treatment
of business imports, final consumers pretend they are businesses.
30 Concerns about the impact of the DBCFT on countries with natural resources or other location
specific rents can be addressed by retaining or introducing a tax on the location specific rent
alongside the DBCFT.
31 Under a cash-flow tax immediate relief is given to all expenditure, including capital expenditure,
and revenues are taxed as they accrue.
32 A DBCFT is equivalent in economic terms to a broad-based, uniform rate VAT with a payroll subsidy.
On the DBCFT, see Auerbach, Devereux, Keen and Vella (2017).
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Once again, however, digitalization may come to the aid of the tax collector. For
example, gathering information from intermediaries such as credit card and other
payment companies could be an important enforcement tool, both for a DBCFT and
a VAT.33
One innovation in the EU that could be applied amongst cooperating countries is a
“one stop shop”, as proposed by Devereux and de la Feria (2014) and the European
Commission (2014). Under such a system a company selling into several separate
countries would need to register in only one; in many cases that is likely to be the
origin country from which the company exports. The tax authority in that country
would administer the DBCFT at the rate of the country to which the good or service
is exported. There would be a clearing arrangement at the aggregate level, where
payments are made between tax authorities in recognition of the appropriate
recipient of the tax. Such cooperation would clearly create a significant
administrative simplicity relative to the case in which the exporter is required to
register and pay tax in each country in to which it exports. Again, such a system is
considerably helped by digitalization of tax returns.
III. Specific issues for digital companies
So far we have considered the implications of digitalization for the taxation of all
businesses, on the grounds that digitalization increases mobility of all elements of
multinational companies. This raises increasingly difficult problems for the existing
international tax system. But now let us consider two cases which might be thought
to be particularly prone to the problems of digitalization.
Two-sided markets
A company has a two-sided market when it provides a platform for bringing together
two economic agents that would like to interact with each other. This is not
necessarily specific to digital companies, but digitalization makes this considerably
easier.34 There are many examples. For example, trading platforms such as Ebay,
Amazon and Airbnb bring together agents that want to sell their goods or services
33 See Lamensch (2015).
34 For further discussion, see Aslam and Shah (2017).
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with consumers that want to purchase them. A common element of such platforms
is that the greater the number of people operating on one side of the platform, the
more attractive the platform is for participants on the other side. For example,
individuals seeking to sell goods or services would find it beneficial if the platform
had many potential buyers. Similarly, buyers would find the platform more
advantageous if there were many sellers.
This advantage can be developed and exploited by companies operating
internationally. Note though, that this can be done without the company itself being
“multinational” in the sense that it operates directly in many countries. In principle,
all that is needed is a website that acts as a platform that individuals around the
world want to engage with. That could be set up and implemented in a single
country. However, a successful company could of course take advantage of
digitalization to locate various parts of its activity and resources in different
countries: programmers and researchers could be in one location, marketing in
another, and servers with which customers interact would be in yet another.
Most of the issues raised in this case are common to the more general businesses
that we have already discussed. However, one question arises in the case where the
tax is based on destination. That is to identify the place of destination. Where both
sides of the market pay for the service provided by the platform, then it seems
reasonable to consider both parties to be customers of the platform; both represent
sales to third parties and hence the location of each can be thought of as a
destination.
But what if only one side of the market were required to pay? For example, suppose
that the platform was trying to encourage more suppliers to register and hence did
not explicitly charge suppliers, but only buyers. Would this mean that since there
were sales only to buyers, that only the location of buyers represented a place of
destination? On the one hand, this does not seem reasonable. Economic theory
suggests that it is likely the cost of paying for the platform would in most cases be
effectively shared by the buyer and seller, even if the explicit charge were applied
only to the buyer. In that case, it might be reasonable to treat the location of the
supplier also as a destination location, even if the supplier had not made an explicit
payment. On the other hand, identifying the effective price paid by the seller
(through charging a lower price) would be extremely difficult. For practical purposes,
it is hard to imagine a tax that sought to impute a tax charge based on the location of
the seller. This issue is the subject of the second case, of free usage.
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Free usage
A number of prominent companies in the digital world – such as Google and
Facebook - offer their services to one set of customers for ‘free’. They generate
revenues through advertising services and use the ‘free’ data provided by users to
enhance these advertising revenues. Again, this business model is not unique to
“digital” companies – for example, free newspapers financed by advertising are
common. But the international scope of these digital companies is clearly now
immense. Furthermore, the data collected offers unprecedented opportunities for
targeted and tailored advertising, thus enhancing the value of the services. The
question then arises as to how the profits of such companies should be allocated to
the different countries in which they operate. We take a MNE operating a search
engine as an example in what follows.
The key issue here is that there is a form of barter. An individual does not pay to
make a search on the MNE’s search engine; but in making a search she reveals
information which is valuable to the MNE in selling advertisements that
subsequently appear on her screen. The purchasers of the advertisements may be
located in another country.
The appropriate allocation of taxing rights in such cases depends on the principle
adopted. Under the existing system, the allocation will primarily depend on the
location of employees selling the advertising. Under existing PE rules, rights to tax
corporate profit are allocated to the country in which the advertiser resides if the
MNE has a PE in that country. Given that the sales process is inherently digital, the
lines defining a PE are somewhat blurred.35 But the underlying problem here is one
of a lack of principle. It is not really clear under what principle the existing system is,
or should be, operating. If the “source” of income is where the advertiser is located,
then this is most naturally associated with the place of residence the advertiser. But
this is not how the OECD model currently works. If profit is allocated to shareholders
and taxed in the residence of those shareholders, then the business model is
irrelevant to the basis of taxation.
Under a destination-based system, we first have to determine what is the
destination country. One obvious answer is that it is the place of residence of the
advertiser. That is the person making a purchase. However, it could conceivably be
argued although the income is received from the advertiser, the service of
advertising is performed in the country of the user, and that the country of the user
35 The UK’s Diverted Profits Tax is at least partly intended to address this issue.
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should therefore be thought of as the destination country. This issue tests the notion
of “destination”. To address this we must return to first principles as to what the aim
of the tax is. If the basic aim is to assign taxing rights to an immobile location, then
there is some merit in identifying the place the service is performed as the place of
destination on the grounds that this will most often coincide with the place of
residence of the (relatively immobile) user. By contrast, if the advertiser is itself a
multinational company, then it may have an incentive to locate its purchasing
activity in a low-tax jurisdiction in order to reduce the tax on the seller, and thereby
also reduce its own net costs. Note however, that whilst this might be an advantage
under certain destination-based corporate tax systems such as sales-based
formulary apportionment, it would not be an advantage under the DBCFT, since the
advertiser would ultimately be taxed where it eventually makes a sale – which it
presumably hopes will be where the user of the search engine is resident.36
We also need to deal with the barter with the user (in what might be thought of as a
different form of a two-sided model). Suppose that the search engine provider is an
MNE that charged a fee for using its search engine, and also paid an equal amount to
those using the search engine for the information that they supply. Then the MNE’s
worldwide profit would be unaffected (apart from greater transactions costs); it
would have revenue and costs, but no net profit, in the country of the user.
Under existing PE rules, this would not generate any taxable presence in the country
of the service provider if the MNE has no physical presence there. However, under a
destination-based tax and based on actual receipts, the MNE’s sales would be partly
attributed to the country of the user and partly to the country of the advertiser.
However, the destination-based tax would also give relief to the MNE for the cost
associated with purchasing information from the user. The net tax base under a
destination-based tax would therefore continue to be zero, as long as the receipts
and costs were equal. The allocation of taxing rights would therefore depend very
much on the value assigned to the search and to the information; identifying the two
values would then be of crucial importance.
Another possibility is that the value of the information collected by the search
engine exceeds the cost of the provision of the search engine. In this case, the barter
is favorable to the MNE, since it does not pay for the information. In effect, the
profit, or economic rent, generated by the MNE is location-specific, since it can only
be generated in the place of residence of the user of the search engine. This gives
that state an opportunity to impose a tax on the barter transaction, which in
36 See Auerbach et al (2017).
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principle could be set at a rate that would not have any effect on the underlying
activity, but would allow that state to capture a share of the economic rent earned
by the MNE. This would be an attractive option for that state.
However, there remains, of course, the difficulty of determining the profit generated,
and hence an efficient level of tax. The difficulty is made worse since there would be
no actual transactions, nor, in all probability, any comparable transactions. If the
level of tax were too high, then the service provider may not be willing to continue
to provide the service. However, this does seem to be an interesting opportunity for
countries to levy what could be an efficient tax on the economic rents of digital
MNEs. Further work is needed on how such a tax could be constructed and levied in
practice.
Another possibility is that the MNE did not collect any information from users.
Suppose instead that it operated more like a free newspaper – its revenues were
from advertisers willing to pay for such advertising despite not having any detailed
information on the users. Would this make any difference to the position? This is not
clear. If the principle is to allocate taxing rights to the country of destination, it could
still be argued that the value of the service provided to the user should be taxable.
However, this could be thought to effectively overturn the business model, which is
to provide a free service financed by advertising.
Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that the issue of barter comes up under other
taxes as well. The country of the user may well consider the user to have purchased
an imported service, in which case it should in principle be subject to VAT. At the
same time, the notional income from the sale of information would be a benefit in
kind for personal income tax. If either tax were collected from individuals the sums
involved would be likely to be so small as to be dominated by the costs of collection.
However, the scale of the large digital companies is so great – that is, they have so
many individual participants – that collecting revenue from the company is more
feasible.
IV. Conclusions
We have considered a number of ways in which greater digitalization has increased
the internationalization of business – for example, shareholders and customers may
be located in different countries, and the company itself can organize itself in
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complex supply chains also covering many countries. These factors pose significant
problems for the national taxation of such international businesses. And these
problems have been reflected in increasing public and political concern over the
strategies used by multinational companies to exploit the existing international tax
system to reduce their tax liabilities.
In our view, the existing system is not a good basis for taxation. It is based on
arbitrary distinctions, between countries (residence v source) and between types of
income (active v passive). Closing loopholes generally increases complexity, and is
unlikely to generate a more sensible and stable system. Rather, fundamental reform
is required – and the tax base should be based on relatively immobile factors, either
where shareholders are located or where consumers are located. Both types of
reform have a significant advantage in that the conceptual basis of the system would
be clear. But they also both raise practical difficulties. A tax on shareholders would
need to associate corporate profit in one country with a shareholder in another. A
tax in the place of sale would need to tax imports, possibly exported by a small
company in another country. However, both problems might in principle be helped
by digitalization. To the extent that tax records are digitized, and possibly combined
with other data, for example, from banks, then the problems of information for
these systems may eventually be overcome.
There are also issues that arise particularly in digital companies. One involves the
case where cash sales are made to advertisers in one country and where the
advertisements appear on screens of users in another country. This may be
combined with the use of information provided freely by those users. At the
moment, there is little attempt to levy a tax in the country of the users, typically
because no money changes hands in these locations. There is a case in principle for
tax to be levied in the country of the user, but there remain significant practical and
conceptual difficulties in doing so.
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